Robust Federated Learning: Defending Distributed AI Against Poisoning Attacks
Project Description
Federated Learning (FL) lets many clients—hospitals, mobile devices, or organizations—collaboratively train a shared model without ever exchanging their raw data, making it a natural fit for privacy-sensitive domains such as healthcare and finance. However, this decentralization opens a new attack surface: because the server never sees client data, malicious or compromised participants can quietly corrupt the global model through data- and model-poisoning attacks.
At InfoLab, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), our research investigates how robust federated learning really is once the convenient assumption of clean, identically distributed client data is removed. We study how poisoning attacks behave under realistic client data heterogeneity (non-IID settings) and how defenses must adapt when honest clients already look very different from one another.
Core Research Themes and Contributions
1. Poisoning Attacks Under Client Data Heterogeneity
Most FL robustness studies assume clients hold similar (IID) data, which makes anomalous updates easy to flag. We move to the harder, more realistic case where each client’s data distribution differs:
- Evaluate data-poisoning (label flipping) and model-poisoning attacks across varying degrees of non-IID partitioning.
- Show that data heterogeneity masks malicious updates, because the natural variance between honest clients shrinks the gap that anomaly-based defenses rely on.
- Quantify how attack success and global-model degradation scale with both the fraction of malicious clients and the severity of distribution skew.
2. Stress-Testing Aggregation and Defense Strategies
We examine how standard robust-aggregation rules hold up under combined pressure from heterogeneity and adversaries, identifying where they fail and what signals remain reliable for detecting compromised participants.
Project Objectives
- Characterize the real-world robustness of federated learning when client data is non-IID and a subset of participants is adversarial.
- Map the relationship between distribution skew, attacker fraction, and model degradation.
- Evaluate and harden robust-aggregation and anomaly-detection defenses for heterogeneous federations.
- Provide reproducible benchmarks for trustworthy, attack-resilient collaborative learning.
Research Impact
This project extends InfoLab’s adversarial-ML expertise from centralized models to distributed, privacy-preserving training. By exposing how heterogeneity weakens existing defenses, our work at InfoLab (SKKU) helps build federated systems that remain dependable in the conditions they will actually be deployed in—hospitals, edge devices, and cross-organization collaborations—where data is never uniform and not every participant can be trusted.