Robust Federated Learning: Defending Distributed AI Against Poisoning Attacks

Project Description

Federated Learning (FL) lets many clients—hospitals, mobile devices, or organizations—collaboratively train a shared model without ever exchanging their raw data, making it a natural fit for privacy-sensitive domains such as healthcare and finance. However, this decentralization opens a new attack surface: because the server never sees client data, malicious or compromised participants can quietly corrupt the global model through data- and model-poisoning attacks.

At InfoLab, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), our research investigates how robust federated learning really is once the convenient assumption of clean, identically distributed client data is removed. We study how poisoning attacks behave under realistic client data heterogeneity (non-IID settings) and how defenses must adapt when honest clients already look very different from one another.

Core Research Themes and Contributions

1. Poisoning Attacks Under Client Data Heterogeneity

Most FL robustness studies assume clients hold similar (IID) data, which makes anomalous updates easy to flag. We move to the harder, more realistic case where each client’s data distribution differs:

2. Stress-Testing Aggregation and Defense Strategies

We examine how standard robust-aggregation rules hold up under combined pressure from heterogeneity and adversaries, identifying where they fail and what signals remain reliable for detecting compromised participants.

Project Objectives

Research Impact

This project extends InfoLab’s adversarial-ML expertise from centralized models to distributed, privacy-preserving training. By exposing how heterogeneity weakens existing defenses, our work at InfoLab (SKKU) helps build federated systems that remain dependable in the conditions they will actually be deployed in—hospitals, edge devices, and cross-organization collaborations—where data is never uniform and not every participant can be trusted.